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[,aval théofof{ique et philosophique, XXXVII,l (février 1981) 
PHILOSO PHY -0 F -GO D, 
THEOLOGY, AND THE 
PROBLEMS OF EVIL 
INTRODUCTION 
Let me begin by recounting two facts. 
Michael VERTIN 
1° For the past few years one of my academic responsibilities has been to 
conduct an undergraduate course entitled "Philosophy of Religion". Until recently 1 
labored under the difficulty of not having found a really adequate approach to 
several of the issues treated in this course, a difficulty typically reflected in the 
students' reactions to my discussion of evil: while admiring my approach for its rigor, 
many students found it "too abstract", "too theoretical", "Iacking concreteness". 
Still more precise1y, for at least a few it was "insufficiently religious" or even 
"insufficiently Christian". 
2° At a 1970 congress of scholars interested in the work of Bernard Lonergan, 
the philosophy-of-God that had been outlined by Lonergan in chapter nineteen of his 
book INSIGHT 1 was subjected to severe criticism. 2 The critics, focussing mainly on 
the account of God's existence and attributes, accused Lonergan of inadequacy for 
making no appeal to the theist's concrete context, the context of re1igious experience. 
This objection occasioned a later response in which Lonergan agreed that an 
adequate phi10sophy-of-God - and, all the more, an adequate theo10gy - must be 
based upon religious experience ; and he went on at sorne length ta deve10p his notion 
of this relationship.l 
1. INSIGHT: A STUDY OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDlNG, New York: Philosophical Library, 1957. 
2. A good deal of this criticism occurred in the discussions rather than in the published papers. See, 
however, the following: Langdon GILKEY, "Empirical Science and Theological Knowing", esp. 
pp. 77-84, and David TRACY, "Lonergan's Foundational Theology: An Interpretation and a 
Critique", esp. pp. 217-21, in Philip McShane, ed., FOUNDA TIONS OF THEOLOGY, Dublin: Gill 
& Macmillan, 1971; and Schubert OGDEN, "Lonergan and the Subjectivist Principle", esp. pp. 229-34, 
in Philip McShane, ed., LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND MEANING. Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1972. 
3. PHILOSOPHY OF GOD, AND THEOLOGY, London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1973. See esp. 
pp. Il-D, 41-42. Cf. "An Interview with Fr. Bernard Lonergan, SJ.". esp. pp. 224-25. and "Natural 
Knowledge of God", esp. pp. 131-33. in Bernard TYRRELL and William F.J. RYAN, eds., A SECOND 
COLLECTION, London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1974; METHOD IN THEOLOGY, London: 
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Now, it recently occurred to me that Lonergan's later explanation of the 
characteristics and relationship of religion, philosophy-of-God, and theology pro-
vides the most adequate framework yet available for treating, among other issues, the 
problems of evil. At least to my knowledge, however, little work had been done to 
exploit that explanation in this area - i.e., to develop in explicit and detailed fashion 
an updated "tract on evil". Consequently, 1 began attempting on my own to 
determine just what the shape of such a treatment might be; and to the extent that 
this allowed me to offer a somewhat revised consideration of evil in my most recent 
philosophy course, 1 found that the students' earlier complaints tended to dissolve. 
ln this article, then, 1 should like to sketch the results of my rough and 
preliminary effort at revising the traditional treatment of evil. Specifically, my aim is 
fivefold: (i) to delineate in cursory fashion the problems that are posed for human 
intelligence, reflection, and deliberation by the fact of evil; (ii) to describe a first 
approach to meeting those problems; (iii) to recall Bernard Lonergan's mature 
account of the characteristics and relationship of religion, philosophy-of-God, and 
theology; and (iv & v) to outline, in two steps, a second approach to the problems of 
evil, an approach suggested by Lonergan's account. 4 
1. EVIL: THE FACT AND THE PROBLEMS 
A. The Fact of Evil 
An individual need not be especially perceptive in order to be aware that reality 
is not perfect. There are the anomalies and breakdowns of nature: earthquakes and 
tornadoes, floods and droughts, physical and mental illnesses, birth defects and 
death. There are the moral failures on the part of other persons, failures to will what 
ought to be willed and to avoid willing what ought not to be willed. And, most 
proximate if not always most readily admitted, there are the major and minor 
aberrations in one's own pattern of choices. 
Nor is this aIl. For besides natural faults and the moral faults of others and of 
oneself, there is the suffering that these bring in their wake. There is the pain of one 
injured in a landslide and the grief of one whose ehild has died of leukemia. There is 
the agony of one subjeeted to physieal torture and the frustration of one subjected to 
racial discrimination. And there is the eharaeter deformation undergone by one who 
lies and cheats, with a heightening of his tendeney to perform further such acts. 
Darton, Longman & Todd, 1972, esp. pp. 101-124; and Lonergan's comments during the fifth 
question session of the Lonergan Workshop at Boston College, June 17-21, 1974, pp. 15-16 of the 
typescript made from the tape (available at the Lonergan Centre, Regis College, Toronto). 
4. 1 must add two qualifications. First, with the exception of its third section, this article is not intended 
to be mainly an exposition of Lonergan's own views. It is obvious that Lonergan is by far the most 
dominant of my sources, but my overriding aim here is systematic rather than exegetical; and, save for 
that third section, the positions which 1 express are mine and not necessarily his. Secondly, the article 
is intended to spell out the general relationship of the problems of evi!, on the one hand, and various 
approaches to them, on the other, but by no means to portray exhaustive\y either those problems or 
those approaches. This emphasis on breadth rather than depth means that certain topies perhaps quite 
familiar to individual readers are treated either in very incomplete fashion or not at ail, a feature which 
1 hope will not be found unduly distracting. 
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In short, if we label natural faults, moral faulls (others' and one's own), and 
one's consequent suffering "evil", we must say not only that ev il is a fact but that it is 
one of the most obvious and striking features of the topography of reality, j 
B. The Problems of Evi/ 
Let us use the term "problem" to na me a question whose answer has not as yet 
been clearly and unambiguously determined. Again, let us use the term "God" to 
name a supreme being, the ultimate object of philosophical inquiry and/or of 
religious devotion. 6 Finally, let us use the term "contradictory" as a substantive to 
designate something opposed so radically to something el se as to exclude totally the 
latter. (Thus, e.g., untruth is the contradictory of truth.) 7 
Now, if one posits that evil really exists, that evil is to be understood as the 
contradictory of good, and that God really exists, then one is confronted with two 
problems that may aptly be labelled "the problems of God" : (1) How is God to be 
understood? 8 (2) How ought God be responded to? And whatever the suggested 
answers to the first (and key) question, one answer that is inadmissible is that God is 
to be understood as both all-powerful 9 and all-good. For if evil is the contradictory 
of good, then God must be at least either incapable of excluding his contradictory 
5. Rather than beginning with an exp/ana/ory notion of evil, in thi, section 1 have attempted merelv to 
e\aborate a simple descriptive notion of evil: the task of explanation remain; to be done. (On the 
distinction between description and explanation, see LOI'FRC;.AI', INSIGHT, e,p. pp. 291-92. Cf. 
pp. 10- 13.) This strikes me as the preferable way of approaching the present topic, given the confusing 
variety of explanatory notions of evil that have been proposed during the long history of reflection on 
iL 
1 suggest the following (at least rough) terminological parallels: my "moral fault", Aquinas' "ma/um 
cu/pae", and Lonergan's "basic sin"; my "suffering consequent on moral l'ault", Aquinas' "ma/um 
paenae", and Lonergan's "moral evil"; and my "natural fault and suffering consequent on it", 
Aquinas' "ma/um na/Urae", and Lonergan's "physical evil". (Sec AQI:INAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 
l, qq. 48-49, and LONIRGAN, INSIGHT, pp. 666-68.) 
My own further distinctions of '"moral fault" Lnto '"one's own" and "others" and of "suffering 
consequent on moral fault" into "one's suffering consequent on onc's own moral fault" and "one's 
suffering consequent on others' moral fault" will, when taken with the previous distinctions, facilitate 
precise consideration of the question of the concrete relationship of one's total suffering and one's own 
moral faul!. (See below, Section Tl.) 
6. 1 speak broadly of "a supreme being, the ultimate object of philosophical inquiry and/or of religious 
devotion" in an effort ta hep my initial discussion open to persons of as many different basic 
persuasions as possible, both philosophical and religious. The expression, however, is not wlthout its 
ambiguities; and therefore let the following points be understood: (1) My "supreme being" is taken to 
be uniquely supreme, not just one of two or more. (2) It is understood to be not merely the greatest of 
whatever beings anyone (c.g., even a professed atheist) might assert actually to exist; rather, it is taken 
as having specifically divine characteristics. (3) To speak of the supreme being as '"an object" is not ln 
imply that it might not also be fundamentally a conscious subjcct (or even, as in the Christian 
theological tradition, trisubjective). (4) 1 am not unaware of (and in fact, whcn speaking more exactly, 
quite agree with) the Thomist aversion to characterizing the divine as "a" being. 
7. See below, n. 15. 
H. In its full form, this question really is twofold: How is God to be understood, and is that 
understanding true? The shorter form of the question, however, illustratcs and emphasizes the general 
point that in the treatment of that which is (ta ken as) fac! it is UNDERSTANDING that is at a 
premium: the question of that understanding's truth, whiJe by no means unimportant and of course 
not ignored, is not the characteristic question of the inquiry. By contrast, there is a prior inqulry that 
begins from mere data and airns ta determine what is and is not facl. and here the question ofTRUTH 
is characteristic. (See LONfR(iAN, METHOD IN THEOI_OGY. pp .. ,47-50.) 
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from the cosmos, and thus not all-powerful, or such that evil is not his contradictory, 
and thus not all-good. 
If, on the other hand, one posits that God really exists, that God is to be 
understood as both all-powerful and all-good, and that evil really exists, then one is 
confronted with two problems that may aptly be labelled "the problems of evil" : (1) 
How is evil to be understood? 10 (2) How ought evil be responded to? And whatever 
the suggested answers to the first (and key) question, one answer that is inadmissible 
is that evil is to be understood as the contradictory of good. For if God is ail·· 
powerful, then he excludes his contradictory from the cosmos; so that if, in addition, 
he is all-good, then evil cannot be the contradictory of goOd. 11 
Our concern in this article is not with the problems of God, as we have 
characterized them, but rather with the problems of evil. That is to say, although 
sorne would challenge the adequacy of such a course,12 we mean to take it as given 
that God really exists and is both all-powerful and all-good, and to con si der the fact 
of evil within the parameters dictated by those suppositions. And thus our problems 
take the following specifie form: 
(1) How is evil - natural fault, moral fault, and consequent suffering - to be 
understood as other than the contradictory of good? 
(2) How, in the light of the foregoing, ought evil be responded to? 
9. Though they are sometimes distinguished in discussions of the present sort, in this paper we take "all-
powerful" (or "omnipotent") to include "all-knowing" (or "omniscient"); for it seems that a God 
who did not "know ail things" would in an important way be unable to "do ail things". 
To say that Gad is omnipotent does not, of course, mean that he is literally able to "do ail things", if 
that expression be ta ken to include, e.g., creating square circles or willing himself out of existence; fOl 
no/ to be able ta do such things is a perfection rather than a limitation. (For a good illustration of a 
misdirected view of this matter, see J.L. MACKI<., "Evil and Omnipotence", MIND, 64 (1955),200-12. 
Rcprinted in Nelson Pike, ed., GOD AND EVIL, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964 .. 
pp. 46-60.) 
10. In its full form, this question really is twofold: How is evil to be understood, and is that understanding 
true') (See above, n. 8.) 
II. In our view, the heart of the God/evil problem-complexu5. may be expressed concisely by stating that 
it is inconsis/en/ to hold ail four of the following positions at the same time: 
a) God - a supreme being - really exists. 
b) God is to he understood as both all-powerful and all-good. 
c) Evil - nalural fault, moral fault, and consequent suffering - really exists. 
dl Evil is to he understood as the contradictory of good. 
Consistency may he achieved by subslltutlllg any one of the following four positions for its correlate in 
the first set (I.e., the first set becomes consistent if one substitutes a' for a, OR b' for b, OR c' for c, OR 
d' for d): 
a') God - a supreme being - does not really exist. 
b') God is not tu be understood as both all-powerful and all-good. 
c') Evil - natural fault, moral fault, and consequent suffering - does not really exist. 
d') Evil is not to be understood as the contradictory of good. 
12. Perhap' the most significant contemporary objectors would come from the ranks of the "process" 
philosophers and theologians, most of whom maintain that God is not all-powerful. (See, e.g., Charles 
HAHfSIlORNL, THE DIVINE RELATIVITY, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948.) And, in a 
somewhat different hne, there is Dietrich Bonhoeffer's poignant image of a suffering God, a God who 
is Iimitcd in power but not in concern, a God who "permits" infant suffering only because he canno! 
prevcnt il. Thus, "Christians stand by God in his hour of grieving." (Sec BONHOEFFER, LETTERS 
AND PA PERS FROM PRISON, New York: Macmillan, 1972, pp. 348-49, 361-63,) 
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II. EVIL: A FIRST APPROACH TO RESOLVING 
THE PROBLEMS 
A. "Older" Philosophy-of-God on Evil 
The question "How is X to be understood?" breaks down into three sub-
questions: "WHAT is X?", "HOW does X come to be?", and "WHY does X 
come to be?" 13 Thus, the complex response of traditional or "older" philosophy-of-
God 14 to the question "How is evil to be understood as other than the contradictory 
of good?" may be presented as a reply to three sub-questions with regard to each of 
the following: moral faults, one's suffering l'rom moral faults, and natural faults and 
one's suffering from them. 
First, then, WHA T are moral faults? They are privations of right choices. In the 
broad sense a privation is sim ply the absence of some positive factor in a thing and 
thus is a somewhat weaker opposition than is a contradiction: From the explanatory 
standpoint cold, silence, and darkness are not positive factors but the absences of 
heat, sound, and light, respectively.15 In the strict sense, however, a privation is the 
13. These three questions, of course, regard X's formai, efficient, and final causes. 
14. The "tradition" here indicated is, broadly, the Aristotelian-Thomist one. The following formulation 
of the tradition's position on evil is our own, though we rely extensively on Jacques MARITAIN, GOD 
AND THE PERMISSION OF EVIL, Milwaukee: Bruce, 1966, Charles JOCRNET, THE MEANING 
OF EVIL, London: Geoffrey CflAPMA:--I, 1963, and LONERGAN, INSIGHT, pp. 666-68. (The basic 
locus in Aquinas is SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, J, qq. 48-49.) The listing of these works together 
occasions a further - and quite important - point, however, and to make that point wc anticipatc 
part of our later discussion. 
One may differentiate three progressively-Iess-abstract, progressively-more-adequate ways of doing 
philosophy-of-God: (1) one which does not explicitly take aceount of the eonscious subject at ail: (2) 
one which explicitly takes account of the conseious subject but merely as intellectual; and (3) one 
which explicitly takes account of the eonscious subject not merely as intellectual but also as moral and 
especially as religious. The first way is illustrated by the approaches of most Neo-Thomists: sec, for 
example, D.J.B. HAWKINS, THE ESSENTIALS OF THEJSM, New York: Sheed & Ward. 1949. The 
second way is illustrated by the approach of Lonergan in chapter nineteen oflNSIGHT. And the third 
way is illustrated by the approach of Lonergan in his more rccent works, such as METHOD IN 
THEOLOGY. 
Now, the first two ways may be grouped together over against the third, inasmueh as the former do 
not consider the conscious subjeet as religious, while the latter docs: and it is upon this difference that 
LONERGAN lays the most emphasis in PHILOSOPHY OF GOD, AND THEOLOGY, the work which 
provided the initial inspiration for the present paper. It is in that work that he designates the third 
a pproach as "newer" philosophy-of-God. 
What, then, of the differenee between the first two approaehes? In PHJLOSOPHY OF GOD, AND 
THEOLOGY, Lonergan tends on occasion (see, e.g., p. 13) to assimilate the second approach to the 
first, which he designates as "older" philosophy-of-God; and this is the practice which, in ordcr to 
focus attention on the other difference, we adopt in this paper. Thus, any philosophy-of-God which 
does not explicitly take account of the conscious subjeet as religious is "older". Moreovcr, wc do not 
distinguish sharply between the first and the second approaches in our present formulation of the 
position of "older" philosophy-of-God on evil. The perceptive reader, however, will not lose sight of 
the fact that both in general and as regards the particular topic of evil the first approach manifests the 
characteristic - and eventually somewhat negatively assessed - features of "older" philosophy-of-
God much more fully than the second approach does, and that the significance of the differences 
which make the second approach much closer to the most adequate - third - approach is by no 
means negligible. 
15. "Philosophy ... distinguishes four types of opposition: first, the opposition of contradiction, which is 
the most radical, in which one of the terms automatically excludes the other : not-man as opposed to 
man; second, the opposition of privalion, which allows the common clement of both terms to suhsist, 
but destroys a generic quality possessed by one of them: in man, blindness destroys sight, and in an 
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absence of not just any positive factor but rather of one that ought to be present: 
blindness in a human being is a privation, though blindness in a stone is not. It is in 
the latter - strict - sense that moral faults are privations: they are inappropriate 
defects of will, failures to choose what is morally mandated and to avoid choosing 
what is morally prohibited. 
HOW do moral faults arise? The issue here is not so much efficient causality as 
deficient causality. Moral faults, in approp ria te "nothings" at the levc\ of human 
voluntary operation, are due entirely to man: they come about fundamentally 
because of bad will, a more radical "nothing" at the level of human voluntary 
disposition. Gad neither directly nor indirectly wills moral faults but merely permits 
them. 
WHY do moral faults arise? Ultimately, the answer to this question is that there 
is no answer. There may be excuses of ignorance, passion, or habit, and there may be 
mitigating circumstances of temperament, age, or social milieu; but properly 
speaking there are no reasons for moral faults. For moral faults are precisely those 
non-events which are characterized not by having reasons but by having no reasons, 
not by making sense but by making no sense whatsoever. However, they are 
permitted by God out of respect for human freedom, a respect that militates against 
divine intervention even when that freedom is abused. 
Secondly, WHAT is one's suffering from moral faults? It is a privation. Though 
pain, sorrow, frustration, a heightened tendency to moral fault, etc., are surely not 
without descriptive reality, in the explanatory order they, Iike cold, silence, and 
darkness, are not positive but negative : they are the absences of factors required for 
one's physical and/or psycho-spiritual wholeness, integrity, well-being. 
HOW does one's suffering from moral faults come about? Obviously, it arises 
directly from the moral faults themsc\ves. And it arises indirectly from (a) the human 
will whence those moral faults arise and (b) the divine will, since God, though neither 
directly nor indirectly willing the moral faults but merc\y permitting them, never-
theless wills that suffering follow on them. 
WHY does one's suffering from moral faults arise? Insofar as it cornes about 
directly from moral faults and indirectly from the human will, one's suffering from 
moral faults has no more reason than the faults themselves do - that is to say, none 
at ail. But insofar as it arises indirectly from the divine will, one 's suffering from 
moral faults has the character of punishment - fundamentally, retribution for the 
faults themselves. 
Thirdly, WHA Tare natural faults and one' s sufJering from them? They are 
privations and their privative consequences. 1 n the explanatory if not the descriptive 
order, so-called natural disasters, disease, decay, death, and the suffering that follows 
abject black destroys white, assuming that black is not taken ta be a colour, as it is for a painter, but 
as the privation of ail colour, as it is for the physicist; third. the opposition of contrariety as betwcen 
two qualities of the same generic type, such as red and green; and fourth. the opposition of relation .. 
the weakest of ail, which does not necessarily involve a lack in either of the Iwo terms - e.g., the 
relations of equality or similarity ... " (Charles JOlfR'-iLT. THE MEANING OF EVIL. pp. 37-38. Cf 
ARISTOTU, METAPHYSICS, V, 10, & X, 4; and AQLI'iAS, META., V, n" 922). 
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on them are the often-progressive absences of positive factors, factors that are 
necessary for the harmony, health, and perceived well-being of this or that 
HOW do natural faults and one's suffering from them come about? They are 
indirectly willed by God: he wills them insofar as he directly wills the entire cosmic 
arder of which the y are parts, 
WHY do natural faults and one's suffering from them arise? They are for the 
good of the cosmic order as a whole, That which from the restricted viewpoint of this 
or that particular thing is but a defect is, from the universal viewpoint of the co smic 
order as a who1e, a contribution to the perfection of that whole, su ch that to 
eliminate the particular defect would be to eliminate a certain amount of cosmic 
perfection. Thus, somewhat as moments of silence are part of the integral beauty of a 
symphony, so natural faults and one's suffering from them are part of the integral 
splendor of the cosmos; or, again, somewhat as pruning a tree occasions the 
devc10pment of better fruit, so natural faults and one's suffering from them occasion 
the development of su ch virtues as courage, perseverance, and kindness. 
The reply of tradition al philosophy-of-God 16 to the question "How, in the light 
of the foregoing, ought evil be responded to?" may be summarized in three steps. 
First, one should strive to eliminate one's moral faults. Secondly, one's suffering 
from moral faults, as punishment for the faults themselves, should be willingly 
accepted. Thirdly, natural faults and one's suffering l'rom them should be eliminated 
insofar as possible and willingly accepted insofar as such elimination is not possible, 
ail as contributions to cosmic perfection. 
B. Merits and Diffieu/ties 
As regards content, perhaps the principal merit of traditional philosophy-of-
God in its treatment of the problems of evil is the thoroughness with which it exploits 
the notion of privation. By understanding the various forms of evil not as positive 
factors but rather as the absences of positive factors which ought to be present, 
traditional philosophy-of-God clearly distinguishes evil from good without - as 
would be inconsistent with the suppositions of God's real existence, omnipotence, 
and all-goodness - making evil the contradictory of good (and thus of God). 
At the same time, the content of that treatment is not without significant 
difficulties. Let us consider two areas. 
First, it is difficult to understand how one's suffering from moral faults could be 
punishment for moral faults. For it is not obvious even in principle either that an all-
powerful God would be bound to require punishment or that an all-good God would 
desire il. Again, even if the necessity of punishment for moral faults be granted, the 
frequent (and frequently gross) disproportion between one's actual suffering from 
16, Strictly speaking, the reply is not that oftraditionalphilosophy-of-Godbut rather oftraditional nalural 
ethic.\' FOLLOWING ON philosophy-of-God (and, as weil, on philosophy-of-man), Here in the text 
we makc this mild distortion in order to stress the real solidarity of practical with theoretical 
considerations (or, in Lonergan's terms, of the fourlh level of consciousness .... ith the first thrcc) on the 
part of the conscious subjecL And on the solidarity of practical considerations in anothcr line, see 
below, n. 30, 
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moral faults - one's own and others' - and one's own moral faults makes quite 
untenable the notion that that suffering is an all-powerful and all-good God's 
punishment for one's own faults. For the relatively innocent (most obviously, 
children) often suffer much, and the relatively guilty often suffer tittle and, indeed, 
even flourish. 17 Nor is it ultimately any less mind-boggling to suggest that God often 
punishes the innocent instead of the guilty, though in such a wa y that the suffering 
which may outweigh the guilt of some individual never outweighs the guilt of his 
group (or, in the timit, mankind) as a whole. 18 And, finally, insofar as one's suffering 
from moral faults cannot be understood simply as punishment for moral faults, the 
appropriateness of the practical admonition to accept that suffering willingly falls 
open to challenge. 
Secondly, it is difficult to understand how natural faults and one's suffering 
from them could be necessary contributions to the perfection of the cosmos. For it is 
not obvious even in principle that an all-powerful God would be unable to cause a 
finite material cosmos at least equal in perfection to the present one but without 
natural faults and consequent suffering. Moreover, even if it be granted that in a 
finite mate rial cosmos natural faults and consequent suffering are necessary to the 
perfection of the whole, it is not obvious even in principle that an all-good God 
would desire to cause such a cosmos rather than none at aIl. Again, even if both 
preceding points be granted, it is still not clear that the natural defects and 
consequent suffering with which the present cosmos is actually shot through are not 
~ell beyond the minimum to which an all-powerful God would be bound and which 
an all-good God would choose. And, finally, insofar as natural faults and one's 
suffering from them cannot be understood simply as contributions to cosmic 
perfection, the appropriateness of the practical admonition to accept willingly 
whatever cannot be eliminated falls open to challenge. 
17. This disparity - at least apparent - is, of course, one of the evidences advanced in certain arguments 
for an afterlife in which the virtuous are definitively rewarded and the unvirtuous are definitively 
punished. (See, e.g., Immanuel KANT, THE CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON, Part l, Book Il, 
esp. Chapter Il, Sections I-IV. Cf. George P. KLURERTANZ, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN 
NATURE, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953, pp. 315-16.) But even if one posited such an 
afterlife and thus envisioned the unvirtuous but prosperous man finally receiving his just deserts, he 
wou Id still be left with the difficulty of understanding how the suffering of one who did not deserve to 
suffer in the first place could ever be "offset" by any "reward", no matter how great. 
18. That this aspect of the problems of evil tends to reopen the problems of God is a familiar theme in 
Iiterature: 
For the hundredth time 1 repeat, there are numbers of questions, but l've only taken the 
children, because in their case what 1 mean is so unanswerably c1ear. Listen ! If ail must suffer 
to pay for the eternal harmony, what have children to do with it, tell me, please? It's beyond ail 
comprehension why they should suffer, and why they should pay for the harmony. Why should 
they, too, furnish material to enrich the soil for the harmony of the future? l understand 
solidarity in sin among men. 1 understand solidarity in retribution, too; but there can be no 
such solidarity with children. And if it is really true that they must share responsibility for ail 
their fathers' crimes, such a trulh is not of Ihis world and is beyond my comprehension ... Too 
high a price is asked for harmony; it's beyond our means to pay so much to enter on il. And so 
l hasten to give back my entrance ticket, and if l am an honest man 1 am bound 10 give it back 
as soon as possible. And that 1 am doing. It's not God that 1 don't accept, Alyosha, only 1 mos! 
respectfully return Him the ticket." 
"That's rebellion," murmured Alyosha, looking down. (From Fyodor Dostoyevsky, THE 
BROTHERS KARAMAZOV, Book V, Chapter IV. Cf. the stance of Doctor Rieux in Albert 
CAMUS' THE PLAGUE.) 
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As regards method, perhaps the principal merit of traditional philosophy-of-
God in its treatment of the problems of evil is its logical rigor. It systematically seeks 
clarity in its concepts, consistency in its contentions, and exhaustiveness in its 
arguments; and if in this or that respect it does not completely achieve those goals, 
still the direction of its tendency is never in doubt. 
On the other hand, traditional philosophy-of-God has two serious deficiencies in 
its method. First, its emphasis upon logical rigor is not only vigorous but also 
virtually exclusive: in its close attention to contents ofthought it t'ails to advert to the 
concrete conscious subject who is the thinker and thus to take account of how his 
subjective disposition can affect his response. 19 Hence the not untypical student 
lament, forcefully if not altogether accurately expressed, "This is too philosophical '" 
The second deficiency is inherent to philosophy-of-God as such : there is a systematic 
prescinding from the contents of formai divine revelation. While quite appropriate to 
philosophy-of-God as distinct from theology, this restriction can appear as artificial 
and even frustrating for the student who, as a - say - Christian believer, is 
interested in bringing ail of his personal reflective resources to bear upon the 
problems of evil; and thus he will, not surprisingly, complain about the "non-
religious" character of the treatment. 
III. LONERGAN ON RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY-OF-GOD. 
AND THEOLOGY 
The preceding section of this article outlined the approach of traditional 
philosophy-of-God to the problems posed for human intelligence, reflection, and 
deliberation by the fact of evil, along with the merits and difficulties of that 
approach. The present section describes Bernard Lonergan's mature view of the 
characteristics and relationship of religion, philosophy-of-God, and theology; and 
the two subsequent sections, drawing out the implications of that view, will sketch 
the two stages of an alternative approach to the problems of evil. 
A. Religion 
We may review Lonergan's notion of religion by considering his accounts of, in 
turn, two kinds of disciplinary inquiry,2° three kinds of conversion,2' and two aspects 
of religion Y 
The first kind of disciplinary inquiry adopts the static, immobile viewpoint of 
Jogie. It concerns itself exdusively with real and/or mental objects, expresses the se in 
terms of abstract concepts, and then seeks to determine the mutual relations of those 
19. Rccall that this indictment applies to thefirst way of "older" philosophy-of-God far more than to the 
second way. See above, n. 14. 
20. See PHILOSOPHY OF GOD, AND THEOLOGY, esp. pp. 13,31-35,45-50. Cf. METHOD IN 
THEOLOGY, esp. pp. 6, 94, 265, 292, 305, 338. 
21. See PHILOSOPHY OF GOD, AND THEOLOGY, esp. pp. 12-13, 40-41. Cf. METHOD IN 
THEOLOY, esp. pp. 115-24, 130-31,237-44,298-99,330. 
22. See PHILOSOPHY OF GOD, AND THEOLOGY, esp. pp. 10, 18-20, 67. Cf. METHOD IN 
THEOLOGY, esp. pp. 105-109, 112-13, 119, 283-H4, 327. 
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concepts within a fixed conceptual system. Its ideal is conceptual c1arity; and it is 
likely to main tain that the pathway to genuine objectivity is careful looking and 
rigorous inferring. It is aptly illustrated by, among other things, traditional or 
"older" philosophy in general and philosophy-of-God in particular. 
The second kind of disciplinary inquiry, by contrast, adopts the dynamic, 
moving viewpoint of method. It concerns itself not merely with real and/or mental 
objects but also with the dispositions, intentions, and operations of the conscious 
subject. It employs concrete symbols as weil as abstract concepts; and it seeks not 
merely to relate these to each other within the static systems which they may 
comprise but also to chart the process from one static system to the next within a 
dynamic system, a system on the move, a system whose developmental structure is 
fundamentally a function of the ever-expanding horizon of the conscious subject 
himself. Its ideal is not just conceptual c1arity but, more broadly, conscious and 
intentional adequacy; and it holds that the pathway to genuine objectivity is, most 
basically, nothing other than authentic subjectivity - experiencing that is attentive, 
understanding that is intelligent, judging that is reasonable, deciding that is 
responsible. 
Now, when undertaken with regard to the conscious subject himself, the second 
kind of disciplinary inquiry - much to be preferred, by reason of its greater 
adequacy - reveals the presence or absence of intellectual, moral, and religious 
conversIOn. 
ln general, a conversion is a radical transformation of the subject's conscious-
ness, resulting in a new horizon that is not just a development from, but rather 
involves a repudiation of, characteristic features of the subject's old horizon. 
The subject who has undergone intel/ectual conversion has outgrown the ocular 
myth that the activity of knowing is fundamentally like seeing, that objectivity results 
exactly from seeing what is there and not seeing what is not there, and that the real is 
the "already out there now" waiting to be seen. Through appropriation of his own 
cognitional performance, he has come to the recognition that the activity of knowing 
is a formally-dynamic compound of activities of experiencing, understanding, and 
judging, that cognitional objectivity results exactly from experiencing attentively, 
understanding intelligently, and judging reasonably, and that the real is the 
compound content that is thus cognitionally achieved. 
The subject who has undergone moral conversion has made the discovery that in 
large part it is he himself who by the choices he makes today determines the self he 
will be tomorrow, and in light of that discovery has undertaken to replace selfish 
satisfactions with self-transcending values as the standards to which he refers in 
deciding and choosing. 
And the subject who has undergone religious conversion is in a state of total self-
surrender, of complete self-transcendence, that can best be characterized as unres-
tricted being-in-Iove. Unrestricted being-in-Iove is a dynamic state that, though it can 
and indeed demands to be expressed and fostered by deliberate acts, is perceived as 
fundamentally prior to those acts, a given, a giftY It brings deep joy and profound 
23. On the distinction between the gift as offered and the gift as accepted. see below. n. 43. 
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peace. And it reveals vital, social, cultural, and personal values not previously 
esteemed. 24 But of itself it does not involve knowledge in the strict sense: it stands as 
the major exception to the dictum that nothing is loved that is not already known, for 
who it is that is loved is not yet known ; and thus there remains a conscious pressure 
in this regard to inquire and understand, to reflect and judge, and, perhaps, to 
believe. Such a cognitional effort, however, goes forward within a context that is 
dominated by the fact of the love itself, so that ail conclusions that would impugn the 
unrestricted lovability of the beloved are virtually if not formally ruled out, and this 
even in advance, as it were, of any inquiry. The effort is not to determine whether 
there is a beloved who is unrestrictedly lovable, for this is not at ail in doubt; rather, 
it is to determine just who that unrestrictedly lovable be10ved is, and ultimately to 
resolve ail other issues in that light. 25 
The distinction between the experience of unrestricted being-in-Iove and the 
public body of knowledge, belief, and practice to which one may turn in cognitionally 
elaborating that experience is the distinction between two aspects of religion. 
Unrestricted being-in-Iove is the inner word, the prior word, that is religious 
experience. It pertains to the world of immediacy: it is the unmediated experience of 
unbounded love for the mysterious beloved. Of itself, it is highly unspecified in 
character and th us possesses a fundamental similarity from one group, culture, and 
age to the next. 26 On the other hand, the public body of knowledge, be1ief, and 
practice is the outer word, the outwardly spoken word, that is religious tradition. lt 
pertains to the worlds mediated by meaning: basically, it would presume to name the 
mysterious beloved. Religious traditions arise and deve10p in the context of the 
particular times, places, pers ons, and events that provide the outward occasions of 
the inward experience ; and thus they are historically conditioned and may vary from 
one group, culture, and age to the next. 
The foregoing distinction, already important for the phenomenologist of 
religion, has an added significance for the Christian theologianY For the latter, the 
distinction between the fundamentally transcultural religious experience and the 
historically conditioned religious tradition is the distinction between the inner core 
and the outer manifestation of God's gift of his love. The inner core, the inward gift, 
24. The apprehension of values tha! is an aspect of unrestricted being-in-Iove is designated by Lonergan as 
faith. It is to be distinguished from knowledge in the strict sense, judgment based upon evidcnce whosc 
sufficiency one grasps personaIly. And it is to be distinguished as weIl from belief, judgment based 
upon evidence whose sufficiency one grasps not personally but rather through the mediation of one or 
more other conscious subjects. It is, nonetheless, a precondition of reIigious belicf. (See METHOD IN 
THEOLOGY, pp. 41-47, 115-24.) 
25. As regards the order of exposition, intellectuai conversion is best treated before moral, and intellectual 
and moral before religious. In the concrete order of occurrence, however, religious conversion 
commonly precedes moral, and religious and moral commonly precede intellectual. (See METHOD 
IN THEOLOGY, pp. 241-43, 267-68. 272-81, 283, 327; and FOUNDATIONS OF THEOLOGY, 
pp. 233-34.) 
26. For a discussion of the common, if very general, features of unrestricted being-in-Iove, see METHOD 
IN THEOl_OGY, pp. 108-109. 
27. Lonergan customarily makes this distinction in expressly theological rather than merely pheno-
menological terms. In a discussion contex! where one does not wish ID presuppose that others have 
explicit religious stances (such as would Jus!ify speaking easily of God's gin, etc.). however, the more 
minimal approach often is useful. 
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is offered, at least, to ail men; and it is the element common to ail religions. By 
contrast, the outer manifestation, the outer expression of God's gift ofhis love, is the 
word of formai divine revelation and summarily the Word who is Jesus Christ; and 
this is the unique and characteristic element of Christianity. Hence, as cognitionally 
elaborated (and, subsequently, as practically implemented), the religious experiencf~ 
of the Christian expressly involves an intersubjective relationship with God as given 
in Jesus Christ, a feature that makes that experience specifically different from ail 
other forms of religious experience. 
B. Philosophy-of-God and The%gy 
Our brief review of Lonergan's notion of religion puts us in position to recall his 
notions of philosophy-of-God 28 and theology.29 (For a guide in what follows, see 
below, Figure 1.) 
FIGURE 1 
The Re/ationship of Religion. Philosophy-of-God. and The%gy. 
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"Newer" philosophy-of-God is a discipline which, by contrast with traditional or 
"older" philosophy-of-God, proceeds not from the static, immobile viewpoint of 
logic but from the dynamic, moving viewpoint of method ; and thus it concerns itself 
28. See PHILOSOPHY OF GOD, AND THEOLOGY, esp. pp. 1-20, 50-59. Cf. METHOD IN 
THEOLOGY, esp. pp. 24-25, 337-40. 
29. See PHILOSOPHY OF GOD, AND THEOLOGY, esp. pp. 15,22,33,34,50,56. Cf. METHOD IN 
THEOLOGY, esp. pp. xi, 138-40, 170, 267, 331, 355. 
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not merely with objects but also, and more fundamentally, with the conscious 
subject. Specifically, it is a reflection on the conscious subject's religious experience in 
terms of its common aspect, the aspect under which the religious experiences of ail 
conscious subjects are similar. That is to say, it is a reflection on unrestricted being-
in-love, the inner word - or, as the Christian theologian expresses it, on the inner 
core of God's gift of his love. Thus, "newer" philosophy-of-God is theology, taking 
the latter in the broad sense of "reflection on religion". 
Theology in the strict sense - Christian theology - as envisaged by Lonergan 
likewise proceeds from the dynamic, moving viewpoint of method. Like philosophy-
of-God it is a reflection on the conscious subject's religious experience; but it 
considers that experience in terms not merely of its common aspect but also of its 
specifically Christian aspect. That is to say, it is a reflection both on unrestricted 
being-in-love, the inner core of God's gift of his love, the inner word, and on 
Christian revelation, the outer manifestation of the divine gift, the outer word 
whence the Christian cognitionally elaborates and practically implements his primi-
tive religious experience. Thus theology in part is methodically and performatively, 
though not logically, solidary with philosophy-of-God: indeed, the former can be 
viewed as the preserving but perfecting sublation of the latter. JO 
IV. EVIL: A SECOND APPROACH TO RESOLVING 
THE PROBLEMS (1) 
A. "Newer" Philosophy-of-God on Evi/ 
"Newer" philosophy-of-God is a reflective explicitation of the ultimate impli-
cations of the dynamic structure of the conscious subject who has undergone 
religious conversionY More exactly, it is a reflective bringing-to-light of what is 
ultimately implied by inquiry, by reflection, by deliberation, and - most basically-
by unrestricted being-in-love. It uncovers and manifests the performative self-
contradiction in which the subject would be involved, were he to deny that there is an 
intelligent ground of the universe, a ground that is world-transcending necessary 
being, the universal moral ground and goal, the unrestrictedly lovable beloved. 32 
"Newer" philosophy-of-God thus arrives at a position that includes the affirmations 
by traditional philosophy-of-God that God really exists and is both all-powerful and 
all-good. And, as regards evil, this leads to the further affirmation that although evil 
30. Of preciseIy which functional specialty of a functionally-differentiated theology is philosophy-of-God 
a performative part? Lonergan argues that it is part of Systematics. (See, e.g., PHILOSOPHY OF 
GOD, AND THEOLOGY, esp. pp. ix-x, 13-14, 16, 19-20,34-35,40-42,45-59.) And he maintains that 
natural ethics, as weil, is part of that same functional specialty, (See, e.g., PHILOSOPHY OF GO D, 
AND THEOLOGY, pp. 15-16.) 
31. Religious conversion modifies the conscious subject's dynamic structure or slale, but of itself it brings 
no new abjeci. (Sec METHOD IN THEOLOGY, pp. 106-107, and PHILOSOPHY OF GOD, AND 
THEOLOGY, pp. 38-39.) From an exclusively philosophical standpoint it is an open question how 
man y persons undergo religious conversion; but see below, n. 43. 
32. Cf. PHILOSOPHY OF GOD, AND THEOLOGY, pp. 52-56, and METHOD IN THEOLOGY, 
pp. 101-103. Note that the procedure of "newer" philosophy-of-God is not fundamentally one of 
inferring conclusions from premises but of uncovering, explicitating, thematizing what is already 
performatively, implicity, operatively present in the concrete conscious subjec!. 
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really exists 33 it is not the contradictory of good ; and that, in turn, eventually gives 
rise to the traditional conclusions as to how evil is to be understood and how it ought 
to be responded to. 34 On the present approach, by contrast with the traditional one, 
however, both the general affirmations about God and evil and the specific 
theoretical and practical conclusions about evil are grasped as functions not just of 
the reasonable but also and more fundamentally of the lovable; and they are 
maintained not as "merely abstract" but rather as finally implied by the eminently 
concrete and full-blooded re1igious experience that provides the characteristic tone 
and color of the subject's entire conscious life. Consequently, though there is no 
significant advance toward formaI resolution of such theoretical and practical 
difficulties as those presented by the conclusions that one's suffering from moral 
faults is punishment for moral faults and that natural faults and one's suffering from 
them are contributions to the perfection of the cosmos,35 and though these difficulties 
thus remain as enigmatic as ever, they now are - to use Newman's terminology-
not just notionally but really apprehended as at least virtually resolved in such a way 
as not to be at odds with the real existence, all-powerfulness, and all-goodness of the 
unrestrictedly lovable beloved. 
B. Merils and Diffieullies 
With respect to content, "newer" philosophy-of-God retains both the principal 
merit and the most significant difficulties of tradition al philosophy-of-God in regard 
to the problems of evil. For in understanding ev il as possessing privative rather than 
positive reality it distinguishes it c1early from good without making it the contra-
dictory of good and thus transposing the problems of evil into the problems of God. 
But, on the other hand, it still is confronted with the theoretical and practical 
difficulties that flow from understanding suffering as punishment and/or a contri-
bution to cosmic perfection. 36 
The superiority of "newer" philosophy-of-God over its predecessor in treating 
the problems of evil derives not from its content but from its method. For inasmuch 
as it grows out of a reflection on the dynamic structure of the concrete conscious 
subject, it eliminates the dry, remote, abstract character possessed by the affirmations 
regarding evil wh en they are reached via the traditional approach. Without in any 
way sacrificing logical rigor, it manifests those affirmations as escapable only at the 
price of denying the unrestricted being-in-love that is the conscious subject's most 
basic dynamic feature; and th us it overcomes the objection that the affirmations are 
"too philosophical". 
Still, "newer" philosophy-of-God does not take account of the characteristic (by 
contrast with common) assertions which the Christian religious tradition makes with 
respect to evil; 37 and thus it remains open to the charge of inadequacy by the 
33. Recal! above. Section Il. 
34. Recall above, Section II. 
35. Recall above. Section II. 
36. Recall above, Section II. 
37. More generaIly, "newer" philosophy-of-God as such does not take account of the characteristic (by 
contrast with common) assertions of any religious tradition. On the other hand. one should recogniz.: 
28 
PHILOSOPHY-OF-GOD, THEOl,OGY, AND THE PROBLEMS OF EVIL 
conscious subject who precisely through reference to that tradition has cognitionally 
elaborated and practically implemented his primitive religious experience. The 
discipline in which this deficiency is rectified, however, is not philosophy-of-God, it is 
Christian theology ; and to a consideration of its stance regarding evil we now turn. 
V. EVIL: A SECOND APPROACH TO RESOLVING 
THE PROBLEMS (2) 
A. Systematic Theology on Evi/ 
Theology - more exactly, Systematics, in the functionally-differentiated theo-
logy that we are prcsupposing 3R - maintains the concrete, dynamic approach of 
"newcr" philosophy-of-God, sublating the latter's reflective explicitation of primitive 
unrestrictcd being-in-love, the inner word of God's gift of his love, and comple-
menting it with a reflection on Christian revclation, the outer expression of the divine 
gift. 39 
The theological reply to the question of how evil is to be understood may be 
indicated briefly by touching three topics : personal sin, original sin, and redemption. 40 
Traditional philosophy-of-God understands moral faults basically as being 
irrational acts, transgressions of the moral order that is discovered by right reason. 
"Newer" philosophy-of-God takes over that notion but goes on view moral 
faults more basically as unloving acts, acts in tension with the dynamic thrust of 
unrestricted loving that underpins the religious subject's conscious life. Theology, in 
turn, takes over both notions and goes on to specify those unloving acts more 
precisely as acts tending ultimately toward rejection of God's love offered to men in 
Jesus Christ; and in this sense it designates moral faults as personal sins. 41 Nor does 
it view at least a certain amount of suffering from moral faults as surprising: one 
de serves to be punished for one's sins. 
Besides the free, contingent, "ethical" aspect of evil, howevcr, evil as directly or 
indirectly chosen, ev il as personal sin and deserved punishment, there is the 
necessary, inherited, "tragic" aspect of evil, evil as given prior to one's choice and 
thus as somehow beyond one's control; 42 and theology understands this in terms of 
that a discipline of such "purity" is at least a mild abstraction: concretcly, cven "newer" philosophy-
of-God doe, not dcvelop in a vacuum, and vinually ail people,are in fact influenced by the characte-
ri,tic and not just the common features of their existential religious contexts, (Sec PHI LOSOPHY OF 
GOD, AND THEOLOGY, p. 55.) 
38. Sec PHILOSOPHY OF GOD, AND THEOLOGY, esp. pp. 21-35. 
39. Sec above, Figure 1. 
40. What follows is, to be sure, but the barest of sketches. In working up this sketch wc have referred, 
among other works, to the following: Karl R.~I!NER, "Guilt-Responsibility-Punishment within the 
View of Catholic Theology", THEOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS, vi, 197-217, "The Sin of 
Adam", THEOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS, xi, 247-62, and "Original Sin", SACRAMENTUM 
MUNO!. iv. 333ff.; Piet SCHOO"'E"'BERG, MAN AND SIN, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1965: and Paul RICŒUR, "The Hermeneutics of Symbols and Philosophical Refleetion", 
INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, 2 (1962), 191-218. 
41 One might argue, of course, that the notion of "sin" as "offense against a (transcendent) person" 
anses already at the level of "newer" philosophy-of-God. On what is, in erfeet, this issue, sec RI(dTIl., 
"The Hermeneutics of Symbols", esp. pp. 193-200, 209-210. 
42. For this distinction, see RICŒUR, "The Hermeneutics of Symbols", esp. pp. 200-20R, 214-18. 
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original sin. Adam 's personal sin has tragic consequences for the entire cosmos, 
consequences which thus radically qualify the situation in which each individual 
"born into Adam" exercises his personal freedom. These consequences involve an 
original state of guilt for ail of Adam's progeny, together with a dynamic inclination 
to ratify that original state of guiIt by personal sin. They involve a heightening of 
natural fauIts and one's suffering from them. And though they bring to light a 
solidarity among men, they specify that solidarity as one in which one person may be 
required to suffer for the personal sins of another. 
Correlative to Adam's sinful act and its cos mie consequences, however, is 
Christ's redemptive act and ifs cos mie consequences. As Adam 's act of lovelessness 
has deleterious effects on the situation in which human freedom is exercised, so 
Christ's act of supreme love has salvific effects on that situation. As in virtue of 
Adam's sin ail men are originally sinful and inclined toward personal sin, so in virtue 
of Christ's vicarious suffering ail men are objectively redeemed and given God's gift 
of unrestricted being-in-love. 4J Thus the concrete conscious subject has not merely the 
opportunity freely to appropriate and ratify his state of original sin by acceding to his 
sinful inclination through personal acts of sin but also the opportunity freely to 
appropriate and ratify his state of objective redemption by accepting God's gift of 
unrestricted loving through personal acts of Christ-like love. And it is precisely 
insofar as men thus "put on Christ" that creation as a whole tends toward the Day of 
the Lord in which not just the "ethical" but also the "tragic" aspect of evil will be 
eradicated. 
The theological reply to the question of how, in the light of the foregoing, evil 
ought to be responded to is threefold.44 First, one should strive to eliminate his 
personal sinning, responding instead to God's gift of love by modelling himself on 
Christ. Secondly, one should willingly accept that suffering which he perceives to be 
deserved for his personal sins, the "ethical" aspect of suffering.45 Thirdly, one should 
willingly accept as weil that suffering which he does not perceive to be deserved for 
43. Il is a theological position that every person is given grace sufficient for salvation, but that every 
person is free to accept or reject that gifl. (See, e.g., METHOD IN THEOLOGY, pp. 108-109, and 
PHILOSOPHY OF GOD, AND THEOLOGY, pp. 18-20,36-38.) Now, the metaphysical distinction 
between grace as given, operative grace, and grace as accepted, cooperative grace, may be translated 
into the categories of intentionality analysis as the distinction between the two moments of religious 
conversion: religious conversion as it is defined and as il is achieved, or, again, as il is recognized and 
as it is accepted. (See METHOD IN THEOLOGY, pp. 241, 283-84, and FOUNDATIONS OF 
THEOLOGY, pp. 225-26.) It is but stating the traditional theological position in contemporary terms, 
then, to say that every person is given the divine gift of unrestricted being-in-Iove, with the option of 
accepting or rejecting that gifl. 
44. As natural ethics is solidary with philosophy-of-God, so moral theology is solidary with speculative 
theology. (Recall above, p. 21, n. 16.) And performatively, at least, these ail come together in the 
functional specialty that is Systematics. (Cf. above, p. 27, n. 30.) 
45. Needless to say. one inclined to conclude tha! his suffering is personally undeserved should consider 
whether it is indeed sinfulness or perceptiveness that he lacks : the traditional view that the greatest 
saints are the most keenly aware of their personal sinfulness is a venerable one. On the other hand. it is 
difficult to maintain tha! absolutely ail suffering is personally deserved, sinee at least the suffering of 
children is a clear counter-example. Moreover, that position, one of the claims of Job's comforters, 
appears - if we may play light with the Scriptures for a moment - to be rejected by the most eminent 
of authorities on the topic! (Sec Job 42: 7ff.) 
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his personal sins, the "tragic" aspect of suffering: he should st rive to endure such 
suffering as Christ endured it, meeting the evil that is suffering and sin with the good 
that is love, returning not evil for evil but good for evil and th us transforming the evil 
into good by making it an occasion for love. 46 
B. Merits and Di/fieu/ties 
As to content, theology in its treatment of the problems of evil preserves the 
chief merit of philosophy-of-God in that regard by understanding evil as privation,41 
But it also makes a considerable contribution of its own by explicitating the Christian 
revelation that illuminates the way in which fault and suffering are, at a deeper level, 
sin and punishment and the way in which their positive counterparts are love and 
redemption. And in this respect it somewhat moderates the incomprehensibility of 
the "tragic" aspect of one's suffering, the aspect that is beyond one's control, 
portraying it as a function of solidarity in sin with Adam and as an opportunity for 
solidarity in vicarious and loving suffering with Christ. N onetheless, this two-
directional invocation of human solidarity does not set the anguishing theoretical 
difficulties to rest; and mystery remains. 
As to method, theology not only is capable of responding to legitimate demands 
for intellectual rigor, and not only takes account of the conscious subject in the 
plenitude of his concrete experience, but also gives full regard to the word (Word) of 
the Christian religious tradition; and thus it considers the problems of evil in the 
fullest and most complete way normally available for intellectual inquiry in via. 
46. LONERGAN develops this point beautifully in terms of "the Law of the Cross". (See DE VERBO 
INCARNATO, editio tertia, Romae: Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1964, Thesis 17a, pp. 552-93.) 
And in the same regard, note the complement to our earlier (above, p. 22, n. 18) literary excerpt: 
"Tell me yourself, 1 challenge you - answer. Imagine that you are creating a fabric of human 
destiny with the object of making men happy in the end, giving them peace and rest at last, but 
that it was essential and inevitable to torture to death only one tiny creature - that baby 
beating its breast with its fist, for instance - and to round that edifice on its unavenged tears, 
wou Id you consent to be the architect on those conditions? Tell me, and tell the truth." 
"No, 1 wouldn't consent", said Alyosha softly. 
"And can you admit the idea that men for whom you are building it would agree to accept their 
happiness on the foundation of the unexpiated blood of a liule victim ? And accepting it would 
remain happy for ever1" 
"No, 1 can't admit it, Brother", said Alyosha suddenly, with flashing eyes. "You saidjust now, 
is there a being in the whole world who would have the right to forgive and could forgive? But 
there is a being and He can forgive everything, ail and for ail, because He gave His innocent 
blood for ail and everything. You have forgotten Him, and on Him is built the edifice, and it is 
to Him they cry aloud, 'Thou art just, 0 Lord, for Thy ways are revealed.'" (From Fyodor 
DOSTOYEVSKY, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV, Book V, Chapter IV.) 
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